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SOUTH ASIA
Strategic competition and nuclear policies
Feroz Hassan Khan
With a plethora of new delivery systems and rising fissile material production rates, India and
Pakistan continue to defy the global normative nonproliferation regime.1 These nuclear invest-
ments are a symptom of the intense strategic competition that has embroiled India and Pakistan
for decades and is now entering a third distinct phase. In the first phase (1974–1998), both states
challenged the nonproliferation regime by developing and demonstrating their respective
nuclear capabilities. In the second phase (1998–2013), both countries focused on developing
operational deterrence force postures, doctrines, and command and control systems. In the
ongoing third phase, nuclear capabilities are modernizing and expanding to encompass sea-
based delivery systems, completing the third leg of the nuclear “triad.”
Rivalry and distrust between India and Pakistan are the central drivers for this nuclear arms
race, and lately, global power politics have been exacerbating these tensions. As the United
States pivots to the Asia-Pacific, China feels threatened and increases its defense spending,
which in turn spurs India to develop and modernize its own strategic and conventional forces,
to include Agni intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and Sagarika submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).Western powers tacitly endorse India’s strategic ambitions
and military investments as a means of “containing” China’s rise, but meanwhile, Pakistan finds
itself increasingly vulnerable. Pakistan is geographically exposed to Indian attack and lacks the
resources to compete with India’s superior conventional military. Islamabad relies on nuclear
weapons to offset this imbalance and has most recently introduced battlefield-range systems,
such as the 60 km-range Nasr. In essence, the Asia-Pacific rebalance is indirectly fueling the
Indo-Pakistani rivalry and incentivizing the expansion of their nuclear arsenals.
As in the past, the international community does not desire an unhealthy arms race between
India and Pakistan.Yet there is no discernable policy or visible involvement in the region that
could mitigate regional tensions or resolve a conflict set in motion.The lack of coherent inter-
national effort to dampen Indo-Pakistani competition and integrate the two states into the
nonproliferation regime has given them carte blanche to double-down on their efforts to
expand and improve their strategic arsenals. South Asia therefore continues to fly in the face of
the global nonproliferation regime in the twenty-first century.
The first section of this chapter will assess the current status and upward trajectories of
Indian and Pakistani strategic forces. The second section examines the evolving military
doctrines and command and control arrangements.The third section examines how regional
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political dynamics have aggravated the Indo-Pakistani arms race, with specific emphasis on the
implications of the A.Q. Khan affair, the US-India nuclear deal, the US rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific, and the lack of progress in regional confidence-building measures (CBMs).The final
section concludes with some prospects for regional peace and stability and some recommend-
ations for consideration.
Status of India and Pakistan’s strategic arsenals
Overview of developments: 1998–2013
India tested its first nuclear device, known as “Smiling Buddha,” in 1974. Despite New Delhi’s
attempts to characterize the test as a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” the die was cast, and Pakistan
began to aggressively pursue the bomb. By the mid-1980s, India and Pakistan had reached
nominal nuclear capability and adopted a “recessed deterrence” posture wherein both states
produced fissile material at a gentle pace, developed delivery means, and conducted several
experiments and cold tests along the way. Nuclear weapons were not overtly declared but both
sides tacitly understood one another’s nascent capabilities. The 1998 nuclear explosive tests
heralded the start of the overt nuclear era. By the turn of the century, conservative estimates of
India and Pakistani nuclear weapons hovered around 40–50 weapons. Delivery was inordinately
reliant on aircraft, as few ballistic missiles had been flight-tested. Nuclear weapons, in other
words, were not fully operational and only notionally employable.
The fifteen years after the 1998 tests have witnessed unprecedented acts of terrorism, mili-
tary crises, and intense international focus on South Asia. It is perhaps no surprise that during
this same period, India and Pakistan have transitioned from a recessed deterrence posture to an
operational one, characterized by a steady expansion of delivery systems and fissile material
production infrastructure.Three events in particular give context to this momentous shift. First,
India and Pakistan came to the brink of full-scale war in 2001–2002 when militants from
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the Indian parliament building in New
Delhi. Second, the discovery and dismantling of the A.Q. Khan network in 2004 put Pakistan
in the proverbial proliferation “doghouse,” damaging its international standing and heightening
its sense of isolation and insecurity.Third, the US-India nuclear deal, announced in 2005 and
legislated in 2008 further heightened Pakistan’s sense of isolation and grievances.
The abovementioned three events certainly did no favors for Indo-Pakistani relations.
Instead, mutual mistrust and security anxieties have increased, and the stakes of conflict are
higher than ever as both countries continue to invest in fissile production and delivery systems.
Of note, observers have pointed out that India and Pakistan now possess more nuclear-weapon
delivery vehicles – including families of cruise and ballistic missiles – than the United States.2
Status of fissile material development
India’s nuclear program began a decade ahead of Pakistan’s. According to the 2013 SIPRI
Yearbook, the Indian arsenal comprises 90 to 110 warheads. Estimates in 2012 put India’s highly
enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile at 2.4 ± 0.9 metric tons, and its weapons-grade plutonium
stockpile at 0.54 ± 0.18 metric tons.3
Pakistani security managers have long feared a fissile material gap with India, and this
perception gained traction in the wake of the US-India nuclear deal, agreed upon in 2005 and
set into motion in 2008. Under the terms of the deal, India was required to separate its civil
and military nuclear installations and submit the civil sites to International Atomic Energy
South Asia
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Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In return, India was granted permission to import nuclear fuel and
technology despite its not being a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). This meant that India could now divert its domestic uranium resources
toward the military nuclear program while relying on imported uranium to fuel the civilian
component.
Pakistan has augmented its fissile production capacity in order to stay competitive with India
and keep pace with the rapid induction of new delivery systems on the subcontinent.After the
1998 tests, Pakistan had only one plutonium production reactor at Khushab, but as of 2014, a
fourth is in the works.As for HEU, Pakistan has expanded the uranium hexafluoride product-
ion capacity at the Chemical Plants Complex at Dera Ghazi Khan, and new-generation gas
centrifuges (P-3 and P-4) have been installed at Kahuta.4 Open-source analysis from 2012 esti-
mated Pakistan to have 3 ± 1.2 metric tons of HEU and 0.15 ± 0.05 metric tons of plutonium
– enough to produce one or two dozen weapons per year.5 Pakistan is currently believed to
have 90–110 warheads.6
In the coming years, Pakistan’s fissile material output is slated to rise. Plutonium production
will increase when the fourth planned Khushab reactor comes online later this decade.
Feedstock for Khushab-IV may come from a new mine that is set to open at Shanawa in 2014,
which will boost Pakistan’s annual production of natural uranium from approximately 36 to 54
metric tons.7 Increased fissile output means more weapons can be produced, and Pakistan can
stretch its fissile stocks further if it adopts composite warhead designs or boosts its weapons with
deuterium-tritium. On the other hand, as Pakistan’s current uranium sources deplete, the
nuclear program will suffer because unlike India, Pakistan does not enjoy the benefit of exter-
nal supply. In any case, given Pakistan’s strides in fissile material production and India’s external
supply advantage, it is no surprise that Islamabad continues to drag its feet in international
negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).8
Strategic triad and force modernization
Indian strategic forces are modernizing under an ambitious program that demonstrates the
country’s burgeoning power projection capabilities. In April 2012, India conducted a flight test
of the 5,000km Agni-V solid-fuelled ballistic missile. Declared as an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM), the Agni is expected to be operational by 2015. India claims it would be
equipped with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), designed to pene-
trate and defeat enemy missile defenses.9 In early 2013, India carried out the maiden test of its
290-km range, supersonic submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) BrahMos, which was
declared to be “ready for fitment on submarines in vertical launch configuration.”10 India also
has plans to field submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) such as the 700 km-range K-
15 Sagarika, whose development trials were completed in January 2013.11 Sagarika is designed
to launch from the Arihant-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and carry a 1,000 kg
nuclear warhead. Each Arihant-class submarine would be able to carry 12 K-15 missiles which
would later be replaced by the 3,500 km-range K-X.Three Arihant-class SSBNs are currently
under construction – one at Visakhapatnam and two in Vadodara, India.12 Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh launched the first nuclear powered boat of this class in July 2009 at
Visakhapatnam with great fanfare, with talk of India joining the elite club of nations equipped
with nuclear submarines.13 In tandem with these new offensive capabilities and delivery
systems, India is also actively developing Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD).
Pakistan’s strategic forces comprise various types of short-range and medium-range ballistic
and cruise missiles.These include the Hatf-1A, Hatf-II (Abdali), Hatf-III (Ghaznavi), Hatf-IV
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(Shaheen-1, Shaheen-1A), Hatf-V (Ghauri), Hatf-VI (b-2), Hatf-VII (Babur), Hatf-VIII
(Ra’ad), and Hatf-IX (Nasr).14 Not content with the suite of delivery options at its disposal,
Pakistan is reportedly developing sea-based delivery systems, as indicated by the 2012
inauguration of the Naval Strategic Forces Command.The sea-based deterrent will most likely
comprise Agosta-class submarines armed with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.15
The rapid development and deployment of delivery systems is not likely to slow down in
the near term. India’s BMD gambit threatens the integrity of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent (at
least in theory if not in practice), thus Pakistan is compelled to diversify its delivery methods
and develop penetration aids. For this reason, the possibility of a Pakistani MIRV, though tech-
nically complex, cannot be ruled out.
Doctrines and command and control
After the 1971 Indo-PakistaniWar in which India successfully dismembered Pakistan and paved
the way for creation of Bangladesh, new factors began to shape the rivalry. The advent of
Bangladesh, for example, simplified the strategic landscape for India and Pakistan. India no
longer had a Pakistani flank on both sides, and Pakistan no longer had to defend two fronts
from India. Following a peace accord in 1972, a period of relative stability prevailed between
the two states, despite India’s 1974 nuclear test which inspired Pakistan’s tenacious pursuit to
obtain a nuclear-weapon capability.
New Delhi’s strategic thinking began to transform by the early 1980s, however, when the
Indian military started to contemplate how to defeat Pakistan in a conventional war before its
nuclear deterrent became operational. As a means to this end, India’s army chief General K.
Sundarji reorganized India’s army formations into a force that could fight a swift battle to sever
Pakistan in two and destroy the country’s nascent nuclear capability. The Indian army con-
ducted several exercises in the mid-1980s to perfect this concept, one of which resulted in a
major military crisis in 1986–1987 (Exercise Brasstacks).16
The 1990s were another time of major strategic shifts.The Soviet war in Afghanistan had
ended, insurgency in Kashmir ramped up, and in 1998, the historic Indian and Pakistani nuclear
tests took place. Thus by the end of the decade, the spectrum of war in South Asia was no
longer solely conventional, but also had a sub-conventional and nuclear element.The nuclear
tests theoretically restored the strategic imbalance and called for strategic restraint measures, but
despite some high-profile political initiatives such as the 1999 Lahore memorandum, India and
Pakistan were unable to agree to a formalized arms control and restraint agreement. Instead, a
“mini-war” in Kargil in 1999 scuttled the prospect of a structured peace.The atmosphere dete-
riorated further in the post 9/11 environment when alleged militants from Lashkar-e-Taiba
and Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the Indian parliament building in New Delhi, resulting in a
ten-month military standoff that lasted from 2001 to 2002.17
With the overt nuclearization of the subcontinent, India’s military concept of the 1980s
was due for a revamp, but India’s botched response to the 2001–2002 crisis provided the true
catalyst for the change. Stunned by the audacity of the parliament attack, India’s political
masters ordered the army to mobilize and move to the international border, but the process
was painfully slow. The strike corps took nearly three weeks to reach their assembly areas.
During this period, Pakistan managed to reinforce the border, India’s political decision-
makers hesitated, and the international community intervened to ease the crisis. Simply put,
the Sundarji doctrine proved ineffective and sluggish. As a result, Indian military planners




India ultimately decided that the only way to fight and win a war against Pakistan without
triggering Islamabad’s nuclear redlines was to keep the operation limited. India’s military goals
and tactics were calibrated to avoid deep strikes but use shallow maneuvers and heavy air-land
firepower to degrade the Pakistani military.Yet Indian military also needed to overcome its
problems of slow mobilization time, political indecision, and diplomatic intervention by the
international community. India ultimately decided upon the so-called “Cold Start” doctrine,
wherein India would muster division-sized forces known as Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs),
which could strike across the international border within 72–96 hours of a crisis and create an
opening for follow-on forces to exploit and consolidate.The objective would be to make shal-
low ingress, inflict maximum destruction of Pakistani military strength, and withdraw – all
without triggering Pakistan’s nuclear redlines. Operations would cease before the international
community could intervene. Naturally, India began to calibrate its military procurement and
nuclear policies to support the Cold Start concept.
Pakistan adapted and refined its own military concepts in response to India’s doctrinal evolu-
tion. It reinforced its passive defenses by constructing a series of obstacles and reduced
mobilization times in an attempt to defensively beat India to the punch.As the Pakistan army’s
2011 doctrine “Comprehensive Response” points out,“With the possibility of Pakistan being
drawn into a war at very short notice, all formations organise their administrative and routine
activities in a manner that effective combat potential can be generated within 24 to 48 hours
from the corps to unit level and two to three days at the Army level.”18 Decreased mobilization
time also grants Pakistan the agility to mount a counteroffensive across the international border
at the place of its choosing as a rejoinder to Indian attack.
Despite the changes to its conventional warfighting doctrine, Pakistan still faced inherent
geographic handicaps in a conflict with India. Pakistan’s main lines of communication are situ-
ated perilously close to the border and could be severed quickly by an Indian blitzkrieg.
Furthermore, Pakistan’s army is conducting counterinsurgency operations in the western tribal
areas, drawing a large number of troops from the garrisons close to India’s border, leaving the
eastern flank somewhat exposed. Pakistani military planners sought a solution for these disad-
vantages.
In April 2011, Pakistan revealed the Hatf-IX, a 60km-range, road-mobile short-range
ballistic missile (SRBM), otherwise known as Nasr.According to a press statement by Pakistan’s
Inter-Services Public Relations directorate, Nasr “carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield
with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes.”19 This system, in other words, is a tactical
nuclear weapon (TNW).The revelation that Pakistan has addedTNWs to its arsenal was widely
seen as a riposte to India’s Cold Start doctrine – an attempt to lower the threshold of credible
nuclear use and thereby deny India the space to prosecute a conventional war under the nuclear
overhang.
The advent of TNWs in South Asia raised a number of complex questions. First, would
deploying the system successfully deter the Indians or incentivize preemption? Second, how
would command and control (C2) be articulated for TNW? Centralized C2 would make the
deployed weapon safe from accidental use but ineffective and vulnerable in the heat of battle.
Third was the question of field security for the weapons. If deployed, they will be located in
the midst of conventional forces operating under an entirely different chain of command.
Despite these complexities, however, Pakistan continues to defend the Nasr and attributes
its development to the growing technological and quantitative conventional force imbalance
with India, as well as the threat posed by India’s limited war doctrine. India’s answer to
Pakistan’s 2011 Nasr test was a test of its own SRBM, Prahaar. India is ambiguous whether or
not Prahaar carries nuclear warheads, but given its 50–150 km striking range and its possible
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role as a replacement for aging Privthi missiles, a dual-use mission is probable – especially since
India is believed to have tested compact warhead designs.20
India and Pakistan also have a differing approach to nuclear doctrine. India has officially
endorsed a doctrine of no first use (NFU), but reserves the right to retaliate massively if Indian
forces are ever attacked with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons – regardless of whether
the attack takes place on Indian soil or foreign territory. Islamabad’s nuclear doctrine, mean-
while, maintains the right of first use and dismisses India’s massive retaliation policy as not
credible, knee-jerk, and disproportionate. Beyond that, Pakistan’s doctrine is shrouded in ambi-
guity, and the country’s exact redlines are undeclared. Pakistan believes an ambiguous nuclear
doctrine and imprecise thresholds paralyze the Indians from embarking on a hostile course of
action. In this formulation, deterrence stability rests on exploiting the adversary’s fear of the
unknown. In 2002, however, Strategic Plans Division Director-General Khalid Kidwai listed
four broad conditions that could elicit a Pakistani nuclear response. Kidwai remarked that
Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large portion of territory, cripples the
armed forces, strangles the economy, or threatens regime survival through domestic destabi-
lization.21
The implications of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear doctrinal mismatch are potentially grave.
Imagine a scenario in which India initiates Cold Start and sends its IBGs across the interna-
tional border into Pakistan. India believes that its massive retaliation policy will deter the
Pakistanis from employing TNWs, but the Pakistanis doubt that massive retaliation is a credi-
ble response to a few low-yield tactical strikes – especially since Pakistan would be able to
survive enough strategic nuclear assets to launch a retaliatory salvo of its own.To simplify, both
India and Pakistan believe that their own second-strike capability deters the other side from
using nuclear weapons, which in turn fosters a misplaced feeling of impunity and incentivizes
brash behavior. And as the repertoire of Indian and Pakistani nuclear delivery capabilities
expand, so does the mutual distrust between the two.
Regional politics
The nuclear and doctrinal competition between India and Pakistan is a symptom of their
frayed bilateral relationship and mutual mistrust. Unfortunately, the diplomatic outlook in
South Asia is not encouraging, as several factors have exacerbated Pakistan’s sense of interna-
tional isolation and its strategic anxieties over India. Specific factors include international
opprobrium over the A.Q. Khan network and increased US-India strategic cooperation
(apparent from the nuclear deal and the Asia-Pacific rebalance). Making matters worse, there
has been a distinct lack of progress in confidence-building and arms control on the subcon-
tinent. India seems to have little incentive for dialogues on peace and security with Pakistan,
citing lack of satisfactory progress in bringing justice against the perpetrators of the 2008
Mumbai terror attack. The end result is a regional strategic environment that is politically
prone to crisis and perhaps conflict.
A.Q. Khan fallout
In January 2004, Pakistani nuclear scientist and head of the Pakistani centrifuge program Dr
Abdul Qadeer Khan admitted to running a proliferation ring that came to be known as the
infamous “A.Q. Khan network.” The illicit network spread nuclear technology not only to
Pakistan but also to defiant regimes such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea. A decade later,
Pakistan continues to suffer the consequences of the network’s unraveling.
South Asia
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A.Q. Khan is viewed as a national hero in Pakistan and is considered to be the “father” of
the Pakistani bomb. Pakistanis believe he has been unfairly castigated for providing Pakistan
with the ultimate deterrent. In contrast, the western narrative views A.Q. Khan as a villain who
established a proliferation ring composed of greedy businessmen who made a fortune by
peddling dual-use technology.This narrative holds that Pakistan’s enrichment capability is the
product of stolen centrifuge designs.
Pakistan has steadfastly denied any official complicity in the proliferation network. As a
gesture of good faith, Islamabad agreed to investigate A.Q. Khan and his accomplices in
Pakistan and share information with the international community, but stopped short of permit-
ting outside interrogation. In addition, Pakistan dismantled the network from its end and has
subsequently taken major steps to improve and tighten its nuclear security and safety regime.22
Yet these actions have failed to erase the blemish on Pakistan’s reputation. Although a decade
has passed since the A.Q. Khan network’s unraveling, Pakistan’s image remains tarnished, and
allegations of state complicity continue.
US-India nuclear deal
While Pakistan has grappled with the aftermath of the A.Q. Khan fiasco, India has reaped the
benefits of a nuclear deal with the United States, announced in 2005 and legislated in
Washington in 2008 as the Hyde Act. The deal essentially granted India a waiver from the
export controls of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), allowing the free importation of
nuclear fuel and technology for civilian purposes. In return, India agreed to disaggregate its
civilian and military nuclear installations and open the civilian sites to IAEA inspection and
safeguards. The deal was controversial from the outset and once again made South Asia the
center of the global nonproliferation debate.
Proponents of the nuclear deal argued that India was a responsible actor and the deal would
yield substantial benefits. They hailed India’s relatively clean external proliferation record –
contrasting with Pakistan, whose record was irrevocably sullied by the A.Q. Khan affair.23 They
also pointed out India’s status as an emerging power with democratic credentials.The benefits
of the deal were primarily threefold for the United States. First, it would bolster the US rela-
tionship with India, a strategic partner and regional counterweight to China. Second, it made
good economic sense, as it would provide the US nuclear industry with lucrative business deals,
especially in the sale of power plants and other related services.Third, although the deal would
not formally bring India into the NPT, New Delhi’s acceptance of IAEA safeguards for its civil
nuclear sites seemed to be a step in the right direction.
Skeptics of the deal voiced serious concerns over its consequences.They argued that the deal
violates the very fundamentals on which the NPT is based, both in letter and spirit. It stands
prejudicial to Article 1 of NPT; dis-incentivizes Article 4 for those NPT member states who
received legal promise of access to peaceful technology by foregoing nuclear weapon ambi-
tions; and makes a mockery of Article 6.The deal confers de facto nuclear weapon status on
India, which is not a party to the NPT and has no legal obligation toward the treaty.
Meanwhile, the deal undermines the United States’ credibility to use the NPT as a legal basis
for pressuring the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. Skeptics of the deal also argued
that US businesses might not profit as envisioned because cost overruns and liability insurance
problems in the US nuclear and defense industry would make Russia and France more
competitive for contracts. Significant for Pakistan’s strategic calculus, meanwhile, was that the
deal explicitly exempted eight power reactors from IAEA safeguards and freed up India’s
domestic uranium resources entirely for military purposes. Several American experts on South
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Asia testifying on the congressional hearings over the Hyde Act warned that it could aggravate
the nuclear arms race in South Asia.
Five years have passed since the Hyde Act was signed into law, and it seems that many of the
warnings on the hill are coming to fruition. The deal changed Pakistan’s calculations over
India’s fissile stocks, compelling Islamabad to step up production of both plutonium and HEU.
Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation has increased. Pakistan continues to oppose the FMCT and
maintains an unattainable hope for a US-Pakistan nuclear deal. No lucrative Indo-American
business deal came to pass, but Russia, France, and Australia have benefited.
Moving forward, Indian membership in the NSG appears likely.The United States, Russia,
France, and the United Kingdom have thrown their support behind India’s bid, though China
remains opposed and several other countries have expressed reservations. Indian membership
would be ironic considering the fact that the NSG was established in reaction to India’s 1974
nuclear test.There is not even talk of Pakistani membership, however.The A.Q. Khan affair has
tainted Pakistan’s record, though Pakistanis feel that the West is exploiting the scandal to
unfairly deny them the privileges of membership. Pakistan’s accusations of discrimination could
be blunted, however, if membership in export control regimes was based on a dispassionate,
criteria-based approach instead of politics and favoritism.A legalistic approach toward member-
ship would also strengthen global nonproliferation norms. As long as Pakistan feels
discriminated against and isolated, it will continue to seek nuclear weapons to guarantee its
security and punch above its weight.
Strategic cascade of the US rebalance
The US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has been criticized as an exercise in rhetoric as opposed
to substance.This analysis may be premature as the rebalance has barely entered its third year,
but regardless of whether Washington underwrites the policy with a credible show of military
and diplomatic force, China and other regional powers in Asia are taking it seriously. China’s
reaction to the rebalance will cause a strategic ripple effect that reverberates throughout South
Asia, indirectly aggravating the Indo-Pakistani arms race.
Beijing perceives the rebalance as an attempt at containment despite Washington’s claims to
the contrary. Fearing encirclement, China has augmented its military spending and will
continue to improve its naval reach and missile forces, which naturally threatens China’s
regional rival, India. India has responded by raising a new mountain corps (17 corps) to be
headquartered in Panagarh with divisions in Assam and Bihar, not far from the disputed terri-
tory of Arunachal Pradesh. In addition, India continues to invest considerable sums in its
military hardware. India plans to acquire hundreds of new T-90S main battle tanks to replace
its aging T-72s, and several air platforms are on order, including Apache attack helicopters and
the new Dassault Rafale fighter. India meanwhile continues to fine-tune its Agni, BrahMos, and
Sagarika series of missiles.All of these acquisitions would be employable against Pakistan.
Unable to match India’s conventional largesse, Pakistan has doubled-down on its nuclear
program, which has most recently developed TNWs and the 60 km-range Nasr. Sea-launched
delivery systems are also in the pipeline. The strategic cascade does not end with Pakistan,
however. Pakistani military advancements – and its close relations with Saudi Arabia – cause
anxiety in Iran; Iranian advancements threaten Saudi Arabia and Israel; and so on. Security
among rivals, after all, is a zero-sum game.As the US rebalance continues into this decade, the
security competition will heat up in South Asia and perhaps beyond.
South Asia
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Negligible progress in CBMs and arms control
Confidence-building and arms control in South Asia exist in a state of limbo. The 2008
Mumbai attack poisoned the well for a diplomatic breakthrough, and relations remain tense
today. Although there are a number of confidence-building measures (CBMs) on the books,
such as crisis hotlines between the prime ministers and Directors-General of Military Oper-
ations, as well as mutual notification of ballistic missile flight tests, there is a distinct feeling that
the low-hanging fruit has already been plucked and both sides lack the political will to engage
in more substantive arrangements. Another pervasive belief is that CBMs are ineffectual for
easing crisis and dissuading conflict. The Lahore Declaration of February 1999, for example,
was a celebrated bilateral agreement in which India and Pakistan promised to resolve disputes
peacefully in good faith, improve bilateral dialogue, and avoid nuclear provocation, but three
months later, Pakistani soldiers snuck across the line of control in Kashmir and occupied aban-
doned Indian posts, sparking the Kargil War. Beyond CBMs, there is also a noticeable dearth of
arms control agreements.There is no agreement to limit conventional force expansion, nor is
there any limitation against delivery system development or fissile material production. Thus
fissile stocks, nuclear arsenals, and delivery systems in South Asia continue to expand unabated.
Many opportunities for arms control exist if only the Indians and Pakistanis would come to
the bargaining table. Pakistan and India both have aging, obsolete SRBMs (the Hatf-I and
Privthi-I, respectively) that are ripe to be decommissioned and dismantled. If India and Pakistan
could agree to dismantle these missiles jointly and transparently, it could inspire mutual confi-
dence and serve as a foundation for future arms control efforts.24 Such an agreement, however,
requires political will. So long as New Delhi and Islamabad lack the political will to make a
diplomatic overture and accept the political risk that comes with doing so, the outlook for
substantive arms control and diplomatic rapprochement in South Asia will remain gloomy.
Conclusions
South Asia continues to fly in the face of the global nonproliferation regime. Strategic arsenals
are expanding, doctrines and command and control are shifting, and Indo-Pakistani relations
remain tense.The situation is unlikely to improve as the United States rebalances to the Asia-
Pacific. China will continue to invest heavily in its military, adding sophisticated missile systems
and naval platforms. India will react accordingly with military investments of its own, which
will naturally threaten Pakistan. Lacking the resources to match India conventionally, Pakistan
will continue to invest heavily in nuclear weapons to deter Indian aggression. This strategic
cascade will continue to intensify the security dilemma on the subcontinent.
South Asia lacks an effective safety valve to ease Indo-Pakistani strategic anxieties.Although
a number of CBMs are on the books, no viable bilateral initiatives for arms control or strategic
restraint exist. South Asia will therefore continue to pose a major challenge to the nonprolif-
eration regime – even more now than in the early period of the NPT (1970s), wherein both
India and Pakistan directly interpreted the treaty as a challenge to their respective national secu-
rity. The motivations underlying the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs are fundamentally
more intense than was the case in the earlier phases of their nuclear history, and the lack of
diplomatic progress makes détente or rapprochement unlikely.
The outlook for stability in South Asia is bleak. Unless regional leaders emerge that see
wisdom in restraint over competition, any future crisis in the region is likely to escalate rather
than be resolved positively.The international community should encourage India and Pakistan
to construct a strategic restraint arrangement. A peace and security architecture of this sort
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would facilitate conflict resolution and help bring an end to the destabilizing security compe-
tition between these nuclear-armed rivals.
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